• PAGE ONE
• INDEX
• HOME

Trade-off between India and US

Sadly, it appears that the sphere that was most in the limelight -- economic issues -- during Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee's recent visit to the US will, perhaps, benefit the least from the new relationship, not because of any insincerity of effort on both th e sides (particularly the Indian) but because of a basic mismatch of interests of the players concern, says Ranbir Ray Choudhury.

AT THE farewell banquet, hosted by the US President, Mr Bill Clinton, for his guest, the Prime Minister, Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee, on the lawns of the White House on September 17, the host left no stone unturned to impress his guest, the Indian people gen erally (on the faraway subcontinent) and the enterprising tribe of expatriates in the US, in particular, that, in recent times, nothing better has happened to American diplomacy than the cementing of the ties of friendship and economic cooperation betwee n the two largest democracies in the world.

Among other things, Mr Clinton said that ``it was more than a slogan for us to say that your success will be our success, and that together India and America can change the world.'' He also asserted that ``we have built the strongest and most mature part nership India and America have ever known''.

On his part, Mr Vajpayee reciprocated by saying that ``the light that radiates above our two nations is of our respective struggles for freedom, for liberty, for individual excellence and enterprise'', adding, ``The century that we leave behind saw many ideas compete for the soul of this world. But we can say today that it is the ideas of Gandhiji and Woodrow Wilson that will triumph. We know that America and India stand on the right side of history.''

Of course they are, if only because both countries are the torchbearers of the principle of participative democracy, which allows the average citizen to determine who will wield power over his destiny for a specific period of time, and also to choose a n ew a different set of leaders on the assumption (which frequently turns out to be wrong, however) that the alternative will do a better job than the preceding dispensation. In other words, both India and the US subscribe to a political philosophy which g oes against the grain of the use of force in public life, a tendency which has ruled supreme over wide areas of human society from the earliest days of civilisation but which, as is evident now, has failed to stand the test of time precisely because it g oes against the very foundations of natural justice, which alone can provide human civilisation with the sense of a basic historical fulfilment.

But having said this, the point that needs to be examined is whether being on ``the right side of history'' guarantees per se diplomatic and economic cooperation, or whether there is a choice which is determined by other factors operating on a country's leadership. Thus, though both the US and India have always been on ``the right side of history'' ever since India gained Independence, there have been long periods when the relationship between the two governments have not been cordial; when, in fact, Wa shington has gone out of its way to befriend Islamabad, though the Pakistani regime has more often been one controlled by the country's military and not mandated by the people.

Clearly, either Mr Vajpayee's formulation of the basis of a ``natural alliance'' between the US and India is wrong (which it is not) or it is not a necessary and sufficient condition for two countries such as the US and India to engage in close and cordi al relations, which is what both Mr Clinton and Mr Vajpayee are trying to suggest.

If there are extraneous factors (other than being on ``the right side of history'') that determine relations between nations, what are these ingredients in the present mix of India-US relations? This canvas has been explored innumerable times in the past and there is no need to go into the details once again. Suffice it to say that with the demise of the Cold War, the world perspectives of both Washington and New Delhi have changed. While the US no longer has to view its foreign policy through a prism d ominated by the colours of the Soviet Union, India, too, does not have to make a choice between one of the two superpowers, or between alignment and non-alignment.

In other words, while Washington can explore new ground by altering its foreign policy framework (in post-Cold War conditions), New Delhi can respond more easily without having to consider whether it has stepped on anyone's toes.

Briefly, to the US, Pakistan has become less important in South Asia than when the USSR was around, and when New Delhi enjoyed close strategic ties with the Kremlin. Today, in the global scheme of things, Communist China has quietly replaced the Soviet U nion, and given the existing links between Islamabad and Beijing, and also the need to counter the natural Asian pre-eminence of China (which will always be a greater strategic threat to Washington's global interests than India can ever aspire to be), it is only natural for the US to strike up a strategic alliance with New Delhi which, after all, is the next most important Asian destination after Beijing (not so much in terms of economics as in terms of sheer geopolitics).

One remembers the 20-year Friendship Treaty which India signed with the Soviet Union in the seventies, when there was a strategic need for such a move by both New Delhi and the Kremlin. Today, there is a qualitatively similar need for a Vision Statement by the US and India to guide relations between the two countries in the 21st Century because of evolving geopolitical conditions.

It is from this perspective that the rhetoric adorning the Indo-US Joint Statement of March 21, 2000, issued after Mr Clinton's visit to India, should be interpreted, specially those parts of which look forward to the two countries working together in th e new century. To take an example, the statement declares: ``We are two of the world's largest democracies. We are nations forged from many traditions and faiths, proving year after year that diversity is our strength. From vastly different origins and e xperiences, we have come to the same conclusions: that freedom and democracy are the strongest bases for both peace and prosperity, and that they are universal aspirations, constrained neither by culture nor levels of economic development.'' The statemen t added: ``Together, we represent a fifth of the world's people, more than a quarter of the world's economy. We have built creative, entrepreneurial societies. We are leaders of the information age. The currents of commerce and culture that link our soci eties run strong and deep. In many ways, the character of the 21st Century world will depend on the success of our cooperation for peace, prosperity, democracy and freedom. That presents us with an opportunity, but also a profound responsibility to work together. Our partnership of shared ideals leads us to seek a natural partnership of shared endeavours.''

Indeed, if one goes through the two Joint Statements (that of March and the one issued on September 15 during Mr Vajpayee's Washington visit), one gets the impression that the earlier document is intended to mark the start of a ``new'' relationship betwe en the two countries which, in fact, is what one would expect if one accepts the analysis of why Washington in particular would want to turn over a new leaf in its ties with India at this juncture.

But what is the bait that the US is holding out to India for the latter to respond favourably to the initiative? Here opinion will differ, but it would appear from a review of the state of past ties between the two countries (``when our relationship drif ted without a steady course'', as the March Joint Statement described this period) that, to Washington at least, it is the Kashmir issue which holds the key to relations with New Delhi. If this is in fact so, how has the change in the US stance been refl ected in the two Joint Statements?

On Kashmir and efforts to counter terrorist activity, the March statement said: ``In the new century, India and the United States will be partners in peace, with a common interest in and complementary responsibility for ensuring regional and internationa l security. We will engage in regular consultations on, and work together for, strategic stability in Asia and beyond. We will bolster joint efforts to counter terrorism and meet other challenges to regional peace. We acknowledge that tensions in South A sia can only be resolved by the nations of South Asia. India is committed to enhancing cooperation, peace and stability in the region.'' The September statement lauded the ``progress of the Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism, and agreed that it wou ld also examine linkages between terrorism and narcotics trafficking and other related issues.'' It also said:

``Noting that both India and the United States are targets of continuing terrorism, they expressed their determination to further reinforce bilateral cooperation in this area.'' On the Kashmir issue, the statement said: ``The two countries reaffirmed the ir belief that tensions in South Asia can only be resolved by the nations of South Asia, and by peaceful means. India reiterated its commitment to enhancing cooperation, peace and stability in the region. Both sides stressed the unacceptability of contin ued violence and bloodshed as a basis for solution of the problems of the region.''

A study of the relevant sections of the two Joint Statements suggests that New Delhi has responded favourably to the US overtures on Kashmir by apparently conceding ground on the nuclear non-proliferation issue (CTBT, etc). Thus, the September statement states: ``India reaffirmed that, subject to its supreme national interests, it will continue its voluntary moratorium

until the Comprehensive Test Ben Treaty (CTBT) comes into effect.'' Again, ``India also reconfirmed its commitment not to block entry into force of the Treaty.'' In comparison, the March statement admitted that ``we have not always agreed'' on how to red uce and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons. Even so, the two countries ``were prepared to work together to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery''. It is clear that India has travelled some distance on this issue duri ng the period separating the two statements.

Kashmir and nuclear non-proliferation are the two spheres where India and the US have engaged in a trade-off because they constitute the two areas which are the most important to the two sides, respectively, vis-a-vis each other. Not surprisingly, they e licited the least hype in the run-up to, and during, Mr Vajpayee's visit. Sadly, it appears that the sphere that was most in the limelight, namely, economic issues, will perhaps benefit the least from the new relationship not because of any insincerity o f effort on both the sides (particularly the Indian) but because of a basic mismatch of interests of the players concerned.