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An attempt must be made to change our election system and the way elections are funded.

In the ongoing elections, governance is an issue that has been deliberately neglected by the candidates. Governance can be assumed to have three features: integrity or absence of corruption; efficiency or absence of waste; and efficacy which may be described as absence of disparity. Good governance calls for all three features, or else governance fails.

For instance, governance may have high integrity and efficiency, and yet generate unacceptable disparity. Or, it may have efficiency but remain corrupt. It could even have integrity but lack efficiency. Such scenarios are neither acceptable nor desirable.

According to the World Bank Institute, governance has three major components: How governments are selected/ replaced; how governments manage resources; and how the institutions that govern their social/ economic interactions are respected.

These features represent inputs whereas integrity and efficacy represent the outputs. Both are important and cannot exist without the other.

We Indians are proud of our democracy. At the same time, we are worried about the way our elections operate, at the money squandered by corrupt candidates.

We are often upset at the way our governments function. We are concerned at the disrespect shown to our judicial, security and regulatory agencies as well as our social service institutions. Evidently, our democracy is flawed and pretty badly at that.

Let us first consider the issue of corruption, especially with regard to elections. We borrowed our election system from the British, who have essentially had a two-party system for over centuries.

Their system was designed for electorates with a size of barely 50,000 electors; our constituencies are 20-30 times larger. In all other democratic countries, the electorate size is at least five-ten times smaller than ours. The British system we copied is inadequate for the sub-continental culture. Not only are our constituencies large; the selection of candidates is also so heavily centralised in our “high command” system that few voters even know the name of the candidate they vote for.

Worse, most candidates are unsure whether they will be allowed to contest again. Even when allowed to contest, they are unsure of retaining the same constituency. Little wonder then that few candidates have any interest in the constituency they win from.

While it’s true that corruption is not restricted to India and exists in virtually all nations considered democratic, the difference is that in other countries corrupt politicians are often caught and punished.

In the US, President Richard Nixon had to give up the presidency. In the UK, Jeffrey Archer, the high-profile author and Deputy Chairman of the Conservative Party, had to go to prison. In our country, many politicians of ill-repute never face trial; even if they do, the case is lost. And even when convicted, they escape prison on some excuse or other.

We may, therefore, conclude that our judicial system is at fault. It is undoubtedly true that our culture and governments do favour the rich and the powerful.

We could try to reform our legal system as well as our selection system, and abolish the powers that our “high commands” enjoy. We might even attempt to change our election system and the way elections are funded. But such reforms are perhaps as likely as cats agreeing to stop drinking milk!

The election system world over suffers from two major flaws. One, most candidates contesting for legislatures win on a minority vote, often less than 20-25 per cent of the electorate. In effect, the first-one-past-the-post rule disqualifies a majority of voters. Two, it confers monopoly power on the elected legislators. To counter the first defect, reformers have suggested we adopt either run-off elections between the top two candidates or proportional representation. However, that still does not do away with the monopoly power that legislators enjoy.

Most legislators promise “contracts” — for instance, electricity lines for the village.

The lines may, in fact, be delivered too but there may be no electricity flowing. Currently, there is no in-built force to ensure candidates function as true representatives. What people want is not just “contracts” but a representative who ensures their fulfilment.

If monopoly is the problem, then competition is the solution. This is seen true in businesses. Elections systems do institute competition to get elected but not beyond. The need is to institute competition among legislators.

For instance, each constituency can have more than one representative so that constituents can choose any among them to redress their grievances. Thus there will be competition and legislators will neglect their constituency only at their own peril.

Unfortunately, however, multi-representative constituencies require either a larger number of legislators or a larger size of legislatures. India already has a large number of legislators in spite of increasing the size of each constituency. Moreover, any such change requires a constitutional amendment which is unlikely soon.

Hence, I suggest a simpler alternative: The MPLADS scheme provides substantial sums to legislators to develop their constituencies. A similar grant, perhaps half the MPLADS amount, could be allocated to the candidate who comes second.

Currently many legislators do not spend their grant at all, perhaps out of disinterest. But if there is competition from the second-best candidate, they cannot remain idle; they will be forced to act and serve their constituents better.

Such a change requires no Constitutional amendment and a mere government order will do. It does not take anything away from the legislators but only provides additional funds to the immediate competitors.

The question is whether this will reduce corruption. With two persons in constant competition, it likely will. At least the MPLADS amount will be spent more carefully and effectively.

Ultimately, there will be less corruption only when there is fear of conviction. Former US President, Mr Bill Clinton has said that it is not the severity of the punishment but its certainty that is a deterrent.

Our laws are unduly harsh; they induce judges to lean backwards and let criminals escape by any route possible. Change the rules; make punishments less onerous. You will then find that judges will not let go of criminals as easily as they do now.

In any case, we need simpler solutions, solutions that will not deter legislators. Let us hope that we will be able to find them — soon.

(To be concluded)

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