Business Daily from THE HINDU group of publications Monday, Jun 19, 2006 |
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Opinion
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Foreign Trade Government - Foreign Relations Columns - Wide Canvas Engaging the Chinese dragon Ranabir Ray Choudhury
Some doubts have been raised about the sensibility of sending the Petroleum Minister, Mr Murli Deora, to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Beijing as a replacement for the Prime Minister, for whom the SCO invitation was meant. The main thrust of the concern is that since China was the host of the sixth summit, the invitation should have been lapped up by the Prime Minister in view of the fact that the present is one of those phases in India's foreign policy where cooperation with China is playing an important role, and it therefore makes no sense to take a step which can be construed as a mild rebuff to Beijing. On the face of it, this is a sensible stand to adopt, but for those who were against Dr Manmohan Singh making the trip to Beijing, the point can always be raised that, at the fifth summit held at Astana in Kazakhstan, it was Mr K. Natwar Singh, External Affairs Minister, who represented India and not the Prime Minister. Admittedly, Dr Manmohan Singh concurrently holds the portfolio of the Foreign Minister and it can be argued that he could have attended the summit in that capacity technically, thereby sending a strong message to Beijing that it holds a special position in New Delhi's universe, at least for the time being. There is much sense in this line of thinking, but the fact remains that the Prime Minister did not go to Beijing and sent the Petroleum Minister instead, which is open to as many interpretations as there are analysts.
Observer status
One line of thinking has been that "given that India is not a full member and the SCO is still in the process of formalising the role of observers, New Delhi perhaps decided that it would not be proper for the Prime Minister... to attend the summit". Indeed, this is precisely what the SCO Secretary-General, Mr Zhang Deugang, told reporters in Beijing when he was asked about the role of the observers at the summit (India along with Pakistan, Mongolia and Iran was given the observer status in 2004). As reported, Mr Zhang said: "We do not want them just to observe our activity; it does not make any sense." He added that the organisation had begun "to develop a scheme for interaction between the SCO and its observers a long time ago. Currently, we have the observer regulations. However, we have yet to determine how to carry on these relations." In Beijing, Mr Deora is reported to have expressed the hope that the organisation "would soon announce on the opportunities for observer-countries to have meaningful and substantive collaboration within the SCO framework." But what precisely is this framework, to answer which question one has to have recourse to the objectives of the organisation and the rationale for its existence, linking this up with the issue of whether India would derive any concrete advantage by joining it?
Defence mechanism
Of interest is the fact that the SCO had its origins in the mid-1990s in the shape of the Shanghai Five grouping following the break-up of the Soviet Union, the main thrust of the group (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan and Tajikistan) being "to strengthen confidence-building and disarmament in the border regions." The group in fact lost no time in signing the Treaty on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions and the Treaty on Reduction of Military Forces in Border Regions, thereby clearly indicating that the initial bonding of the group was essentially oriented towards a mutual defence mechanism, in which a country like India could simply have no place. Regular annual meetings were held and, as so often happens, the scope of cooperation was gradually expanded to include "political, security, diplomatic, economic, trade and other areas," till in 2001 Uzbekistan was admitted as a member and the grouping meeting in Shanghai which was its birthplace five years earlier was officially given the name of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
Main Objectives
A charter was adopted which listed the main objectives of the SCO as strengthening "mutual trust, friendship and good neighbourliness," consolidating "multidisciplinary cooperation in the maintenance and strengthening of peace, security and stability in the region," jointly counteracting "terrorism, separatism and extremism in all their manifestations," encouraging "efficient regional cooperation in such spheres as politics, trade and economy, defence, law enforcement, environment protection, etc.," and promoting "human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with the international obligations of the member States and their national legislation." Among the areas of cooperation, the Charter lists maintenance of "peace and enhancing security and confidence in the region," "development and implementation of measures aimed at jointly counteracting terrorism, separatism and extremism... and also illegal migration," "support for, and promotion of, regional economic cooperation in various forms, fostering favourable environment for trade and investments with a view to gradually achieving free flow of goods, capital, services and technologies," and the "effective use of available transportation and communication infrastructure, improvement of transit capabilities of member States and development of energy systems." In a nutshell, this is the backdrop against which India's presence in the SCO has to be seen, perhaps the main point of interest lying in the area of setting up energy transport infrastructure in the shape of gas and oil pipelines and perhaps even power transmission lines. Clearly, the core defence aspect of the organisation should hold no interest for New Delhi, more so because of the new phase of strategic India-US cooperation that has been set in motion in recent times. If this is indeed the ground situation, it stands to good reason that the Prime Minister chose not to attend the Shanghai summit in person and to send the Petroleum Minister instead. Certainly, no stone should be left unturned in New Delhi's quest to forge a bond of lasting economic and diplomatic cooperation with Beijing. But there are other channels which can be used to attain the objective, and not one (like the SCO summit) where the diplomatic spin-offs may not be to the best advantage of the Indian republic.
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