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B. Raman

FOR nearly two months now, there have been no major public demonstrations in Pakistan over the US-led `war' against terrorism in Afghanistan and over the co-operation extended to this `war' by Gen Pervez Musharraf. His detention of the leaders of many Islamic religious organisations such as the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI), the Jamaat-ul-Ulema Islam (JUI) Pakistan factions have not led to any major street protests by their cadres.

Gen Musharraf's telecast address of January 12, 2002, in which he strongly condemned the activities of religious extremist elements and his subsequent ban of January 15, 2002, on the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), the Tehrik Jafferia Pakistan (TJP), the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) and the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and the arrests of nearly 2,000 of their political and administrative cadres have been, by and large, supported by the non-religious political parties, but with nuances.

The Pakistan People's Party (PPP) has been pointing out that the manner in which Gen Musharraf took these steps has given the impression as if this was done under Indian military pressure. The criticism by the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) of Mr Nawaz Sharif has been somewhat stronger, but Gen Musharraf has no reasons to be worried over it.

His ban on the sectarian and other extremist organisations has naturally been strongly condemned by the affected organisations and by other religious formations, but there have been no street protests except in pockets of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Provincially-Administered Tribal Areas (PATA), which are the strongholds of the TNSM, but these have till now been easily controlled by the junta.

Incidents of sectarian acts of terrorism in Pakistani Punjab and Sindh have come down, but this was to some extent due to a large number of the SSP cadres going to Afghanistan to help the Taliban and the Al Qaeda in their `jehad' against the US and the Northern Alliance and getting killed there.

There are no reports of serious dissensions among the Corps Commanders over the policies pursued by Gen Musharraf since September 11. However, Gen Mohammad Aziz, who was eased out of his Corps Command in Lahore by Gen Musharraf and appointed to what was then perceived as the largely ceremonial post of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee on October 8, 2001, has, after lying low for two months, started playing a high-profile role.

He has been actively interacting with the leaders of the extremist organisations of Pakistan as well as with the surviving leaders of the Taliban and the Al Qaeda, who have taken shelter in the mosques and madrasas of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), Balochistan, the FATA and the PATA.

Gen Aziz presided over a Corps Commanders' conference last month when Gen Musharraf was away on a bilateral visit to China, has been interacting with visiting US military officers, inspecting frontline troops and naval formations to check their state of readiness in the event of a military conflict with India and, earlier this month, led a military delegation to Beijing for the periodic military interactions between the two countries.

There are two ways of interpreting his resumed high-profile role.

One, he has been doing it on his own, thereby diluting the authority of Gen Musharraf. There is so far no strong evidence in support of this interpretation. Second, Gen Musharraf himself has been consciously giving him a high-profile role to get from him as a quid pro quo his support for his actions against the extremist elements. The Islamic extremist and jehadi organisations hold Gen Aziz in some respect and listen to his advice. His long years as the clandestine Chief of Staff of the Army of Islam of the Afghan war vintage give him strong powers of persuasion and restraint over the leaders and cadres of these organisations and Gen Musharraf needs Gen Aziz's support to prevent any street backlash against him.

Ground reports from Pakistan and Afghanistan speak of seething, subterranean anger against him and the US. This anger is of two kinds — the Muslim anger over what is perceived as his silent complicity in the ill-treatment of those captured by the US in Afghanistan and the Pashtun anger over his perceived failure to protect the dignity and honour of the members of this community. The Muslim anger has been caused by the reports brought in from Afghanistan by the cadres of various Pakistani organisations and serving and retired officers of the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment, who have since come back to Pakistan, about what they project as the horrendous treatment of the Islamic warriors by the troops of the US and the Northern Alliance and the ruthless nature of the US air strikes.

This anger has been further aggravated by stories spreading across mosques and madrasas in Pakistan and Afghanistan about the treatment allegedly meted out to the Al Qaeda and the Taliban detenus by the US and about the conditions under which the Al Qaeda prisoners were taken to the US naval base in Cuba and are detained there.

It is alleged that the treatment meted out to them showed utter lack of respect to Islam and a shocking spirit of vindictiveness beyond belief.

Among the specific allegations made are that the beards of the Al Qaeda and other prisoners were forcibly shaved off by their US captors, that their copies of the Holy Koran taken away, that they were not allowed to say their namaz the required number of times collectively, that they were shackled and chained.

The Pashtun anger has been caused by the large number of civilian casualties inflicted on the Pashtuns in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan by the US air strikes and other military operations, by the perceived marginalisation of the Pashtuns in the interim administration headed by Hamid Karzai, despite his being a Pashtun himself, by what is seen as the attempt at the forced Westernisation of the Afghan society, particularly the Pashtun society, by a group of Western-backed and Western-applauded elite without any grassroot support in the local society, and by the ruthless hunt for the Taliban leadership and Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda, who are still seen by large sections of the Pashtuns as their friends, guests and protectors.

The Pashtun anger is directed not only against the US, but also against Karzai and Gen Musharraf. Karzai does not command much respect amongst large sections of the Pashtuns, who see him essentially as the US' `yes man' or `quisling'. His writ does not run outside Kabul; it is doubtful whether his writ even runs in Kabul itself outside his office as the head of the interim administration. There is considerable resentment over his failure to condemn US air strikes on a group of tribal elders proceeding to Kabul on the day of the inauguration of his interim administration. In Afghanistan, the survival of any leader would depend upon his having the command of the Holy Koran or the gun or both. He does not command the support of either the clerics or the warlords, who are in the process of re-establishing their autonomous control over the areas from which they were driven out by the Taliban. The Pashtun society is an extremely conservative one in which religious leaders command respect, and the leaders of the Taliban, though defeated, are not bereft of some popular support in the Pashtun belt of Afghanistan as well as Pakistan. bin Laden and his Al Qaeda too still retain a measure of popular support on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border as well as in Pakistan's military-intelligence establishment.

Without such support, it would not have been possible for the Taliban and the Al Qaeda leaders to successfully evade capture so far. All the handsome cash rewards promised by the US, amounting to millions of dollars, have not tempted the Pashtun community to betray them. Conscious of this public sympathy, if not support, the new Pashtun leadership, which took over power in Eastern and Southern Afghanistan in succession to the Taliban, has been playing a typical double game. Even while pretending to co-operate with the US in its hunt for bin Laden and other leaders of the Al Qaeda and the Taliban, they have been quietly helping them to take shelter in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan.

Lt Gen Ehsanul-Haq, the Pashtun Director-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence, has been under contradictory pressure from the US for more intelligence and assistance in the Osama and Taliban hunt and from his Pashtun community not to betray the community and its traditions of solidarity and hospitality to guests by helping the US in its hunt.

Reflecting the Muslim and Pashtun anger against the US and Musharraf, Barrister Baachaa, the Pashtun intellectual of the NWFP, said in a statement on January 13, 2002: "The youth of a self-respecting nation was humiliated for an act of terrorism in New York on September 11 in which they had no involvement whatsoever and knew nothing about it. Pakhtoons' history would never forgive or forget those who either abetted or endorsed the American orgy of death and destruction in Afghanistan. For the humiliation of Afghan Taliban, who have been subjected to insults and inhuman treatment by the Americans in the US army prison in Cuba, the partners of the US and those who encouraged the US by their silence (writer's comment: An apparent reference to Gen Musharraf) would be answerable to the Pakhtoon nation in due course of time.'' These sentiments and anger are widely shared and could eventually pose a threat to Gen Musharraf's life and his continuance in power. Pakistan is a conspiratorial society. The absence of public demonstrations to give vent to anger does not mean that people are not boiling inside and waiting for an opportunity to strike at the US and at those among their co-religionists perceived by them as betraying their honour and dignity to curry favour with the US.

(The author is former Additional Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India.)

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